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AFTER O2 MICRO:  THE COURT’S EVOLVING 
DUTY TO MAP WORDS TO THINGS 
Peter E. Gratzinger†
One of the central conundrums of patent law is how to map 
words to things. Since Markman, and the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in O2 Micro, it  has been the duty of the court to resolve disputes over 
the scope of patent claims. Yet trial courts take very different 
approaches to discharging this duty. For example, some will provide 
constructions for dozens of claim terms, while others will determine 
that all but a few should be given their “plain meaning” by the jury. 
This Article discusses developments in Federal Circuit authority 
regarding the substantive and procedural duty of district courts to 
resolve disputes over claim scope. It argues that courts should read 
O2 Micro as a mandate to take an active role in ensuring that trial 
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]hat’s for y’all to fight over and for the jury to resolve.” So 
ruled an Eastern District of Texas Magistrate when a dispute arose 
over the meaning of “an” and “said” in a patent claim.1 According to 
the Federal Circuit, the ruling was reversible error.2 The Federal 
Circuit held in an unpublished disposition that the trial court had a 
duty to resolve the claim construction dispute rather than allowing the 
lawyers to each argue their own theory of the meaning of the claim to 
the jury.3 The Federal Circuit’s decision cited to the Federal Circuit’s 
seminal case in O2 Micro, which held that “[w]hen the parties raise 
an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of [asserted] claims, the 
court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.”4
Yet despite this seemingly simple premise, there is wide 
variation in how district courts interpret and implement the duty to 
resolve claim construction disputes. A striking example of this 
variation can be seen in the way that two different district court 
judges in the District of Nevada handled two parallel patent 
infringement actions filed by the same patent owner, Unwired Planet 
LLC. 
In the first case against Google Inc., the district court construed 
the claims of five patents.5 Unwired Planet argued that many terms 




 4. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2008).
 5. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00504-MMD, 2014 WL 7012497, 
at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2014). The author is counsel of record for Google, Inc. in this matter, 
from which an appeal is pending. 
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had a “plain meaning” and required no construction.6 The district 
court disagreed, holding that O2 Micro required it to construe claims 
when the scope is in dispute.7 The district court provided 
constructions for all twenty-two terms submitted by Google for 
construction.8 Ultimately, Unwired Planet stipulated that it could not 
prove infringement of any of the five patents at issue under the district 
court’s constructions—including the constructions of the terms for 
which it had advocated a “plain meaning” construction.9
Unwired Planet’s lawsuit against Square before a different judge 
in the same district took a very different trajectory. Square sought 
construction for sixteen terms from three patents, roughly in 
proportion to Google’s request to construe twenty-two terms across 
five patents.10 The district judge in the Square case, however, cited 
O2 Micro for the proposition that “a district court is not obligated to 
construe terms with ordinary meanings, lest trial courts be inundated 
with requests to parse the meaning of every word in the asserted 
claims.”11 The district judge agreed with Unwired Planet that only 
two of sixteen terms submitted by Square needed construction, and 
that the remainder are “best given their ordinary meanings.”12 Unlike 
the Google case, this result was apparently not dispositive. The parties 
continued to litigate until the proceedings were ultimately stayed in 
favor of Covered Business Method review by the Patent Trial and 
Appeals Board.13
It is apparent, therefore, that while the key principle of O2 Micro 
may be clear, district courts vary widely in their views of how to put 
it into effect. Two key questions frequently arise in district court 
litigation regarding the duty to construe claim terms: (1) when (if 
ever) can a construction of “plain meaning” satisfy the trial court’s 
duty under O2 Micro, and (2) when (if ever) is it simply too late to 
ask the trial court to step in? 
 6. Id. at *16, *22, *30. 
 7. Id.
 8. Id. at *1 & n.3. 
 9. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00504-MMD, Dkt. No. 463 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 26, 2015). 
10. See Unwired Planet, LLC v. Square, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00579-RCJ, 2014 WL 
4966033 at *7 (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2014)). 
 11. Id. at *2 (citing O2 Micro, supra note 4.). 
 12. Id. at *7. 
 13. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Square, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00579-RCJ, Dkt. No. 109 (D. 
Nev. Feb. 10. 2015). 
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Three recent Federal Circuit cases provide some guidance on 
these issues. In the first case, Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver 
Spring Networks, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the trial court 
failed to comply with O2 Micro by providing the jury with a “plain 
meaning” construction, and held that under the correct construction, 
no reasonable jury could have found infringement.14 Circuit Judge 
Bryson dissented, arguing that the trial judge correctly resolved the 
dispute between the parties by rejecting the defendants’ narrow 
proposed construction in favor of “plain meaning.”15
In the second case, Nuance Communications, Inc. v. ABBYY USA 
Software House, Inc., the Federal Circuit appeared to suggest that it 
was not error for the trial court to leave the scope of the claim to a 
jury, where the party seeking a clarification of claim scope had earlier 
asked for and obtained a “plain meaning” construction.16
In the third case, GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
held that even two weeks into trial, it was not too late for the patent 
owner to ask the trial court to further construe a claim term, but that 
the trial court did not violate O2 Micro when it refused to do so, 
because the original construction gave adequate guidance to the 
jury.17
This Article takes a closer look at the duty of courts to resolve 
disputes over patent scope, in theory and in practice. The first part 
frames the judge’s duty to resolve disputes over claim scope within 
the broader academic literature about patent law’s central conundrum 
of mapping words to things. The second part provides background on 
the two touchstone cases regarding the duty to construe: the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Markman and the Federal Circuit’s decision in O2
Micro. The third part addresses Federal Circuit authority regarding 
the adequacy of “plain meaning” constructions to resolve the parties’ 
disputes, up through the recent Eon Corp. decision. The fourth part 
addresses Federal Circuit authority regarding procedural limits on the 
trial court’s duty, up through the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in 
GPNE.
 14. Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d. 1314, 1319 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 15. Id. at 1329 (Bryson, J. dissenting). 
 16. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368, 
1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 17. GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d. 1365, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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I. THE DIFFICULTY OF MAPPING WORDS TO THINGS
The practice of patent law is often a prolonged wrangle over the 
meaning of seemingly simple words and phrases. The disputes center 
on the patent claim, a formal legal writing which is supposed to put 
the public on notice of the “metes and bounds” of the claimed 
invention.18 The pivotal role played by a formal legal writing makes 
patent litigation quite unlike other types of intellectual property 
litigation.
In a copyright infringement trial, for example, a jury directly 
compares one recording to another, or a book to a screenplay. The 
jury is instructed to compare the “original expression” in one work to 
determine if it is “substantially similar” to the other.19 There is no 
instrument, written by a lawyer, accompanying each copyright 
registration to explain the outer boundaries of the creative expression 
embodied in the work. Thus, the jury must exercise its own judgment 
and reach its own conclusions about how much similarity is too 
much.20
In a trade secret misappropriation trial, the jury will be presented 
with the defendant’s conduct—for example, the customer list copied 
from the server two days before resignation or the phone calls to 
customers the following week—and be asked to make a judgment 
about whether the defendant had misused something secret and 
valuable in violation of a duty. There may be efforts to crystallize the 
alleged trade secrets prior to trial, for example through contention 
discovery, or in California, through disclosures under section 
2019.210 of the Code of Civil Procedure Section.21 Ultimately, 
however, the jury will not be comparing the defendant’s product to a 
preexisting legal instrument that defines the metes and bounds of the 
trade secret. Instead, the jury will be making judgments—about duty, 
breach, secrecy, economic value—that are often difficult to extricate 
from one another. 
 18. See, e.g., In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 536 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“The claims of a validly-issued patent serve an important notice function, alerting the public of 
the metes and bounds of an inventor’s discovery.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
20. Id. at 1077 (“the intrinsic test [for substantial similarity], which examines an ordinary 
person's subjective impressions of the similarities between two works, is exclusively the 
province of the jury.”). 
 21. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2019.210. 
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The goal of a patent trial is to determine whether the defendant is 
using the plaintiff’s original invention. In this respect, it is not very 
different from the goal of a copyright infringement trial, which is to 
determine whether the defendant is using the plaintiff’s original 
expression. But the jury in a patent trial is not asked to compare the 
plaintiff’s novel gizmo with prior art that lacks the inventive feature 
and with the defendant’s knock-off that allegedly includes it. Instead, 
the jury is asked to perform a mechanical comparison of the 
defendant’s product with a highly stylized paragraph of text written 
by a lawyer or patent agent, like the following paragraph that was the 
claim at issue in O2 Micro:
A DC/AC converter circuit for controllably delivering power to a 
load, comprising an input voltage source; a first plurality of 
overlapping switches and a second plurality of overlapping 
switches being selectively coupled to said voltage source, said first 
plurality of switches defining a first conduction path, said second 
plurality of switches defining a second conduction path; a pulse 
generator generating a first pulse signal; a transformer having a 
primary side and a secondary side, said primary side selectively 
coupled to said voltage source in an alternating fashion through 
said first conduction path and, alternately, through said second 
conduction path; a load coupled to said secondary side of said 
transformer; and a feedback control loop circuit receiving a 
feedback signal indicative of power being supplied to said load, 
and adapted to generate a second signal pulse signal for controlling 
the conduction state of said second plurality of switches only if 
said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold; and drive 
circuitry receiving said pulse signal and controlling a conduction 
state of said first and second plurality of switches based on said 
first and second pulse signals, wherein, said drive circuitry 
alternating the conduction state of said first and second plurality of 
switches, controlling the overlap time of the switches in the first 
plurality of switches, and controlling the overlap time of the 
switches in the second plurality of switches, to couple said voltage 
source to said primary side.22
A patent claim like the one above simply describes a thing, or 
sometimes, a series of steps. It typically contains no clues about 
which elements or steps are new and which are conventional. It 
includes no explanation of how the item described is an improvement 
on its predecessors. It is about as lifeless a piece of prose as can be 
written. And for the jury that must determine infringement, the task is 
 22. U.S. Patent No. 6,259,615 col. 10 l. 55 (filed Nov. 9, 1999). 
2016] AFTER O2 MICRO 147
supposed to be blinkered: Does the accused product include each and 
every of the elements of the claim, or did it not?23 Is the accused 
converter circuit “adapted to generate a second signal pulse signal for 
controlling the conduction state of said second plurality of switches 
only if said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold,”24 or 
is it not? 
The jury need not know anything about what the patentee 
invented to determine if the patent claim is infringed.  The patent 
specification, of course, typically includes discussion of what the 
inventor contributed to the art. But, as discussed further below, 
interpreting claim scope in light of the specification is the job of the 
judge, not the jury. 25
Disputes over validity, and particularly obviousness, can 
sometimes breathe more life into the question of what the inventor 
actually contributed to the art. The Supreme Court has warned against 
an overly rigid approach to obviousness, holding that “rules that deny 
factfinders recourse to common sense” are “neither necessary under 
our case law nor consistent with it.”26 Nonetheless, a central 
component of proving anticipation or obviousness is an exercise in 
box-checking a list of limitations in a patent claim as compared to one 
or more prior art references, an exercise not so different from the 
infringement analysis.27
Some commentators see this mode of resolving patent 
infringement disputes as fundamentally flawed. Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley have argued that the uncertainty of patent scope prior to claim 
construction (and thereafter, given the high rates of reversal) show 
that the current conceptual model “isn’t working” and that “it may 
simply be impossible to cleanly map words to things.”28 The authors 
suggest abandoning the idea of “peripheral claiming,” where the 
23. See, e.g., Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (“[O]nce the claims are construed, infringement is assessed by comparing the accused 
device to the claims, and the accused device infringes if it incorporates every limitation of a 
claim, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
24. Id.
 25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
 26. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
27. See e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(anticipation requires showing that “a single prior art reference discloses each and every 
limitation of the claimed invention,” and obviousness requires, inter alia, a comparison of 
“differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.”). 
 28. Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, at 1745 (2009). 
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patent claim defines the outer boundaries of the inventor’s legal 
rights, and moving toward a system of “central claiming,” in which 
“the patentee discloses the central features of the invention—what 
distinguishes it from the prior art—and the courts determine how 
much protection the patent is entitled to by looking at the prior art that 
cabins the invention, how important the patentee’s invention was, [] 
and how different the accused device is.”29 The patent infringement 
analysis, in Burk and Lemley’s view, should be a more holistic and 
judgment-driven exercise, like copyright analysis.30
Burk and Lemley see O2 Micro as a significant obstacle to 
achieving this new norm: “The legal rule that most complicates the 
process,” they write, is the Federal Circuit’s decision in O2 Micro 
“that every dispute over patent scope must be resolved as a matter of 
claim construction. . .”. 31After O2 Micro, courts have no power to 
limit the scope of claim construction by passing the dispute to the 
jury, no matter how unambiguous the language of the claim might 
seem.”32 The more that claim construction is a formalistic process in 
the hands of the judge, Burk and Lemley argue, the further away the 
process gets from types of judgment a jury must exercise in a 
copyright trial.33
“Central claiming,” however, would require a radical rethinking 
of the modern patent system in the United States. Short of such a 
revolutionary change, perhaps it is possible to see O2 Micro as an 
opportunity rather than an obstacle to outcomes that fairly and 
predictably protect inventions. The judge, after all, is supposed to 
interpret claims “with a full understanding of what the inventors 
actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.”34 Thus, 
even if the jury must be blinkered in making an infringement 
determination, the judge need not be blinkered in interpreting the 
scope of the claim. 
For example, in Nuance Communications, the plaintiff brought a 
dispute over claim scope to the attention of the court prior to trial.35
The court was in a position to resolve the dispute over how to map 
 29. Id. at 1746. 
 30. Id. at 1774-76. 
31. Id. at 1754. 
 32. Id.
33. Id.
 34. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Renishaw 
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added). 
 35. Nuance Commc’ns, supra note 16, at 1372. 
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words to things with reference to the specification and “a full 
understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to 
envelop with the claim.”36 The jury, in the end, was guided only by a 
tautological dictionary definition.37 The Nuance decision refrained 
from second-guessing the procedures of the trial court that, on their 
face, appeared to give ample opportunities to the plaintiff to make its 
case. Still, it does bear asking, at what cost? 
Indeed, one might expect that a large proportion of infringement 
disputes could be resolved by the court without assistance from the 
jury. Certainly, some infringement disputes turn on disputes of fact, 
such as a case where infringement turns on a doctrine of equivalents 
analysis,38 or on the accused infringer’s willful blindness in an 
indirect infringement case.39 But in many cases, the relevant facts 
about how the accused product works or how it is constructed are 
undisputed by the close of discovery. 
O2 Micro appears to give Courts the authority to resolve many 
disputes over how words should be mapped to things, and by 
extension, many infringement disputes. Yet, as this Article shows, 
district courts can sometimes be reluctant to pick up those tools. 
II. THE TOUCHSTONES OF THE COURT’S DUTY TO RESOLVE DISPUTES 
OVER CLAIM SCOPE: MARKMAN AND O2 MICRO
A. Markman v. Westview Instruments
In Markman, the Supreme Court held that “the construction of a 
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within 
the province of the court.”40 The Supreme Court began its analysis 
with the familiar rule that the right of trial by jury preserved by the 
Seventh Amendment is “the right which existed under the English 
common law when the Amendment was adopted.”41 The Court found 
that “evidence of common-law practice at the time of the framing 
does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment’s jury 
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at 1373. 
 38. Brilliant Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(expert’s “detailed application of the function-way-result test to the claim element and the 
allegedly equivalent feature of the accused product is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact for the jury to resolve.”). 
 39. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011). 
 40. Markman, supra note 25. 
 41. Id. at 376 (quoting Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 
(1935)).
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guarantee to the construction of the claim document.”42 Thus, the 
Court turned to “existing precedent,” “the relative interpretive skills 
of judges and juries,” and “statutory policies” to determine how to 
allocate claim construction between judge and jury.43
Finding “no clear answers” in “history and precedent,” the Court 
moved on to “functional considerations.”44 According to the Court, 
“the construction of written instruments is one of those things that 
judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by 
training in exegesis.”45 Patent construction, the Court continued, “is a 
special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and 
practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to 
give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, 
therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a duty, than a 
jury can be expected to be.”46 Finally, as to policy, the Court held that 
“uniformity in the treatment of a given patent” is an independent 
reason to “allocate all issues of construction to the Court.”47
In light of these holdings, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Federal Circuit, which had affirmed the trial court’s 
directed verdict based on the judge’s determination that the accused 
product could not infringe the patent when properly construed.48
B. O2 Micro v. Beyond Innovation
In O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit amplified the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Markman, making clear that not only is the scope of claims 
within the province of the court, but that the court has an affirmative 
duty to resolve disputes over claim scope when they arise.
In the O2 Micro case, the defendant appealed a final judgment of 
infringement on the basis that it was legal error for the district court to 
fail to construe a limitation that the parties referred to as the “only if” 
limitation.49 The limitation required a control loop circuit to control 
the conduction state of a switch “only if” a feedback signal was above 
 42. Id. at 384. 
 43. Id.
 44. Id. at 388. 
 45. Id.
 46. Id. at 388-89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) 
(No. 10,740)). 
 47. Id. at 371, 390. 
 48. Id. at 391. 
 49. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1354. 
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a predetermined threshold.50 The parties disputed whether a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would have understood this limitation to apply 
at all times without exception, or only during the “steady state 
operation” of the switch.51 The defendant argued, for example, that 
the “only if” limitation was not satisfied during the “start-up phase” 
of the switch, and therefore, that the claim was not infringed.52
During a claim construction hearing prior to trial, the district 
court acknowledged the dispute over the whether there can be any 
“exception” to the “only if” limitation, but declined to resolve it.53
Instead, the district court held that “‘[o]nly if’ has a well-understood 
definition, capable of application by both the jury and this court in 
considering the evidence submitted in support of an infringement or 
invalidity case.”54 At trial, both parties presented arguments regarding 
whether or the “only if” limitation allows for exceptions.55 The jury 
found the claim infringed.56
The Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of infringement.57 It 
held that Markman required the district court to resolve the dispute 
over the scope of the “only if” limitation.58 The Federal Circuit 
explained the district court “failed to resolve the parties’ dispute 
because the parties disputed not the meaning of the words themselves, 
but the scope that should be encompassed by this claim language.”59
The Federal Circuit continued, “[a] determination that a claim term 
‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may 
be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or 
when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the 
parties’ dispute.”60
Following this holding, the Federal Circuit proceeded to assure 
district courts that they “are not (and should not be) required to 
construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims.”61 The 
 50. Id. at 1360. 
 51. Id. at 1361. 
 52. Id.
 53. Id.
 54. Id. (quoting O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2:04–CV–32, 
2005 WL 6343460, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005)). 
 55. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1358. 
 56. Id.
 57. Id. at 1361, 1366. 
 58. Id. (citing Markman, supra note 25). 
 59. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1361. 
 60. Id.
 61. Id. at 1362. 
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Federal Circuit quoted its prior statement in U.S. Surgical Corp. that
claim construction “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”62
The U.S. Surgical case had been tried and appealed prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Markman and had come back before the 
Federal Circuit on remand for further consideration in light of 
Markman.63 On remand, the Federal Circuit found that there was no 
error in the trial court’s failure to provide claim constructions because 
none of the proffered constructions “was directed to, or has been 
shown reasonably to affect, the determination of obviousness” that 
had been dispositive in that case.64 While acknowledging this 
outcome in U.S. Surgical, the Federal Circuit nonetheless concluded 
that “[w]hen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the 
scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.”65
III. WHEN IS A “PLAIN MEANING” CONSTRUCTION ADEQUATE?
One key question raised by O2 Micro is when, if ever, it is 
appropriate for trial courts to resolve the parties’ disputes by holding 
that a claim term has its “plain meaning.”66
The Unwired Planet cases are illustrative of the fact that, on the 
whole, accused infringers tend to seek detailed constructions, while 
patentees tend to ask for “plain meaning.”67 There are numerous 
strategic reasons that parties typically behave in this manner. For 
example, even some months into discovery, the patentee may have a 
less detailed understanding of a complex accused product than the 
accused infringer. A patentee may perceive a “plain meaning” 
construction as affording more flexibility down the road to read the 
patent claim on the accused product as details about that product 
emerge. More generally, a patentee may reason that the more 
flexibility it maintains regarding claim scope, the more likely it is to 
survive summary judgment and get in front of a jury. It is therefore 
common for patentees to offer “plain meaning” as a broader and/or 
more flexible alternative to the defendant’s proposed construction. 
 62. Id. (quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)).
 63. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 64. Id.
 65. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1362. 
 66. Compare, e.g., Unwired Planet, supra note 5, at *1 & n.3 (construing twenty-two 
claim terms despite plaintiff’s request for numerous “plain meaning” constructions) with
Unwired Planet, supra note 10, at *2 (holding that fourteen of sixteen claim terms have their 
“plain meaning”). 
67. See Unwired Planet, supra note 5, at *1 & n.3; Unwired Planet, supra note 10, at *2. 
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For the accused infringer, the reverse is true. The accused 
infringer will have a detailed knowledge of its products and will be 
motivated to make clear, as early in the case as possible, that the 
patent does not read on its product. The lower standard of proof for 
non-infringement (preponderance of the evidence)68 versus invalidity 
(clear and convincing evidence)69 may tip the strategic scale for an 
accused infringer to seek a narrow construction that excludes the 
accused product, rather than a broad construction that encompasses 
the prior art. With the increasing popularity of inter partes review, an 
accused infringer may even employ a dual strategy of narrow 
constructions in the district court litigation and broad constructions 
before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board under the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” standard.70
Because of these competing strategic interests, it is not 
uncommon for a district court to be faced with a long wish list of 
detailed constructions from an accused infringer, while the patentee 
urges that fewer terms be construed or that many of the terms be 
given their “plain meaning.” On occasion, the reverse can also be 
true, with an accused infringer seeking a “plain meaning” 
construction and a patentee seeking detailed definition that, for 
example, the patentee hopes will clearly distinguish the claimed 
invention from a key prior art reference, or will clarify that the 
accused product is in fact within the scope of the claim. 
O2 Micro provides that the “determination [of] a claim term[‘s] 
‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when the term has 
more than one ordinary meaning or when reliance on the term’s 
ordinary meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”71 But this 
begs the question: When does reliance on the term’s ordinary 
meaning resolve the parties’ dispute? 
A. Rejection of a Narrow Construction in Favor of “Plain 
Meaning” May Resolve the Parties’ Dispute, Particularly When 
It Is Binary 
Multiple Federal Circuit decisions, discussed below, have held 
that by explicitly rejecting a narrow construction in favor of “plain 
 68. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 69. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
 70. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146, 195 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2016). 
 71. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1361. 
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meaning,” the district court did, in fact, resolve the dispute over claim 
scope, as O2 Micro requires.
In ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., for 
example, ActiveVideo argued that the district court erred under O2
Micro by rejecting its claim construction and adopting Verizon’s 
proposed “plain meaning” construction.72 The Federal Circuit 
disagreed and affirmed the district court’s denial of ActiveVideo’s 
JMOL of non-infringement.73
The patent at issue in ActiveVideo disclosed a two-dimensional 
method of channel surfing, with “anchor channels” on a vertical axis 
(e.g., ABC) and channels related to the anchor channels (e.g., ABC 
News, ABC Sports) on a horizontal axis.74 Superimposed on the 
display of an anchor channel were two indications: one identifying the 
anchor channel as an anchor channel and another indicating the 
existence of associated multiplex channels.75 In particular, the method 
claim required, in relevant part, “superimposing the first indication 
over the display of the first anchor channel” and “including with the 
first indication a second indication” related to the associated 
channels.76
ActiveVideo argued that under a correct construction of the 
claim, “the first and second indications must be overlaid on the 
displayed anchor channel and that they must be distinct from the 
content of the anchor channel.”77 ActiveVideo argued that its system 
could not infringe under this construction because the indications 
(channel labels) in its system are broadcast as part of the “underlying 
content” of the anchor channel and are thus not “superimposed.”78 In 
other words, it appears that the parties disputed what it meant to 
“superimpose” an indication: Did it require two distinct pieces of 
graphical content with one overlaid on the other, or could the 
limitation be satisfied by a single piece of graphical content with 
multiple visual elements? 
Verizon argued that “the district court resolved the dispute 
between the parties and satisfied O2 Micro by declining to adopt 
 72. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 73. Id.
74. Id. at 1324-1325. 
75. Id. at 1325. 
 76. Id. at 1325. 
 77. Id.
 78. Id.
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ActiveVideo’s construction and giving the terms their plain and 
ordinary meaning.”79 The Federal Circuit agreed that rejecting the 
accused infringer’s proposed restrictive construction was sufficient to 
resolve the dispute.80 The Federal Circuit further held that “[i]t was up 
to the jury to determine from the evidence presented at trial whether 
the ActiveVideo system satisfied the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the ‘superimposing’ limitations.”81
The Federal Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Summit 6, 
LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.82 There, the dispute centered on the words 
“being provided to” in the following claim limitation: “[] pre-
processing said digital content at said client device in accordance with 
one or more pre-processing parameters, said one or more pre-
processing parameters being provided to said client device from a 
device separate from said client device. . .” (emphasis added).83
Samsung, the accused infringer, argued in the trial court that this 
limitation required ongoing activity, namely, the provision of the pre-
processing parameters during the operation of the method.84 The
patentee argued that the phrase merely described a characteristic of 
the pre-processing parameters, i.e., that they originated on a separate 
device.85 The patentee argued that the phrase imposed no temporal 
limitation on when the pre-processing parameters had to be 
provided.86 The patentee requested that the words be construed as 
having their “plain meaning,” and the trial court agreed.87
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the patentee that 
“being provided to” did not require ongoing activity, holding that the 
phrase is “not a step in the claimed method.”88 The Federal Circuit 
also rejected Samsung’s argument that with its “plain meaning” 
construction, the trial court had failed to resolve the dispute over the 
scope of the claim term, as required by O2 Micro.89 The Federal 
Circuit explained that “[a]t the claim construction stage, the district 
 79. Id.
 80. Id. at 1326. 
 81. Id.
 82. Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 83. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,765,482 at col.14 ll.1-5 (filed Oct. 8, 2004)) (italics
altered).
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court rejected Samsung’s argument. . . to further construe the term 
because it was a ‘straightforward term’ that required no 
construction.”90 The Federal Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed claim language is clear, 
the district court did not err by declining to construe the claim 
term.”91
When the trial court rejects a proposed construction as too 
narrow or otherwise incorrect, it undoubtedly goes some way toward 
resolving a dispute over claim scope. Whether it has fully resolved the 
dispute, however, and ensured that the jury will not misapply the 
claim language, would seem to depend on the circumstances. 
The Summit 6 case appears to be a good example of a rejection 
of a detailed construction in favor of “plain meaning” construction 
that truly resolved the dispute between the parties. There was a single, 
binary dispute over the scope of “being provided to”: Did it require 
ongoing activity, or not? The trial court held that it did not, a result 
later confirmed by the Federal Circuit.92 Samsung presumably knew 
better than to argue otherwise to the jury (or was ordered not to do 
so).93 Thus, there was little danger that the jury would take claim 
construction into its own hands and misconstrue the scope of the 
claim, despite the trial court’s “plain meaning” construction. 
The outcome in the ActiveVideo case is perhaps more 
ambiguous. The trial court rejected the accused infringer’s argument 
that the “superimposed” limitation requires there must be two distinct 
pieces of graphical content that are overlaid onto a third.94 The 
patentee argued on appeal, however, that even this narrowed 
construction would not have eliminated infringement because it 
“places no limitation on how or where the indication is generated, as 
opposed to how it is displayed to the viewer.”95 The patentee’s 
argument suggests that the dispute was not binary and that there were 




 93. Even when a trial court adopts a “plain meaning” instruction, it can still prevent the 
parties from advocating a construction that it previously rejected, thus cabining the scope of the 
“plain meaning” that the jury may consider. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 
626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (no violation of duty under O2 Micro where trial court 
“prevented the jury from reconstruing the term by stopping Defendants’ expert” from arguing a 
position the court had previously rejected). 
 94. ActiveVideo, supra note 72. 
95. Id.
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limitation: (a) distinct graphics that are overlaid at the time of display 
to the viewer; (b) distinct graphics that are overlaid at any point in 
time; or (c) a single piece of graphical content with distinguishable 
elements. The trial court rejected the first possibility, but then turned 
the problem over to the jury to apply the “plain meaning.”96 It is not 
entirely clear that the district court’s resolution left no room for the 
jury to make its own determinations of claim scope. 
B. In Eon Corp., Rejecting A Narrow Construction for “Plain 
Meaning” Failed to Resolve a Non-Binary Dispute 
In Eon Corp, the Federal Circuit held that the trial court had 
neglected its duties under O2 Micro by rejecting the accused 
infringer’s proposed narrow constructions and giving the limitations 
“portable” and “mobile” their “plain meaning.”97 The Federal Circuit 
further determined that no reasonable jury could have found that the 
accused devices were “portable” or “mobile” in the context of the 
claimed invention, and reversed the judgment of infringement.98
The patents at issue in Eon Corp. were directed to techniques for 
wireless communications between a local subscriber and a base 
station to overcome certain problems related to heavy network 
traffic.99 The claims required the subscriber units to be “portable” or 
“mobile.”100 The specification described “portable battery-operated 
milliwatt transmitter subscriber units” that can be “moved throughout 
the base station geographical area” and can be “handed off” from cell 
to cell.101 The accused subscriber units were “electric watt-hour utility 
meters designed to be attached to the exterior walls of buildings.”102
Silver Spring, the accused infringer, sought a construction of 
“portable” and “mobile” as “capable of being easily and conveniently 
moved” and “designed to operate without a fixed location,” as 
opposed to “fixed or stationary products that are only theoretically 
capable of being moved.”103 The patentee, Eon, argued that the term 
should be given its “ordinary meaning.”104 The trial court agreed, 
 96. Id. at 1324-26. 
 97. Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1318. 
 98. Id. at 1323. 
 99. Id. at 1316. 
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holding that Silver Spring was “asking for nothing the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the terms cannot do on their face—distinguish 
from ‘stationary’ or ‘fixed.’”105 The trial court held that this 
“‘resolved the parties’ claim scope dispute.’”106
The Federal Circuit disagreed.107 It explained that while “a court 
need not attempt the impossible task of resolving all questions of 
meaning with absolute, univocal finality,” the trial court does have a 
duty under O2 Micro “to resolve a dispute about claim scope that has 
been raised by the parties.”108 The Federal Circuit continued: 
The crucial question was whether, as Silver Spring argued, the 
terms should not be construed so broadly such that they covered 
“fixed or stationary products that are only theoretically capable of 
being moved.”109 By determining only that the terms should be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning, the court left this question 
of claim scope unanswered, leaving it for the jury to decide. This 
was legal error.110
The Federal Circuit proceeded to construe the words “portable” 
and “mobile” in light of the specification.111 The majority found that 
“the specification’s guidance on the claimed ‘portable’ and ‘mobile’ 
units is that they are low-power, battery operated units that are easily 
transported between different locations in a house, office, car, or 
throughout a cell territory,” and that “Eon’s position is completely 
untethered to the context of the invention in this case.”112 Having 
effectively adopted the claim construction that had been proposed by 
Silver Spring and rejected by the trial court, the Federal Circuit held 
that no reasonable jury could have found the accused utility meters to 
be “portable” or “mobile.”113
Judge Bryson’s dissent in Eon Corp. disagreed that the 
specifications of the asserted patents supported the “restrictive 
definition” adopted by the majority, and argued that under the 
“ordinary” meaning of “mobile” and “portable,” there was sufficient 
 105. Id.
 106. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
107. Id. at 1318. 
 108. Id. at 1319. 
 109. Id.
 110. Id.
111. Id. at 1320. 
 112. Id. at 1321. 
 113. Id.
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evidence to support the jury’s verdict.114 The dissent pointed out that 
the jury heard extensive testimony regarding the portability of the 
utility meters, including evidence that the accused meters “are smaller 
than a volleyball and can be, and are, easily carried and installed by 
hand.”115 The dissent concluded that the “ordinary meaning [of 
portable]—something capable of being easily and conveniently 
transported—would clearly apply to the accused devices in this 
case.”116
Judge Bryson’s dissent further disagreed that the trial court had 
shirked its duty under O2 Micro by holding that the disputed terms 
had their “plain meaning.”117 Instead, he argued, “the district court’s 
instruction that the jury should give those terms their plain and 
ordinary meaning resolved the parties’ dispute, because it was clear 
that Eon was relying on the plain meaning of the terms and Silver 
Spring was relying on a special definition of the terms that it claimed 
to be supported by the language of the patents.”118
At a high level, the holding of Eon Corp. may appear 
inconsistent with the holding of Summit 6. In both cases, the trial 
court rejected a narrow proposed construction as incorrect, and told 
the parties to apply the “ordinary meaning” instead.119 Yet in Summit 
6, the Federal Circuit held that this was effective in resolving the 
parties’ dispute, while in Eon Corp., the Federal Circuit held that it 
was not.120
On closer inspection, it may be possible to reconcile the two 
decisions. In Summit 6, the claim construction dispute was binary: 
either the claim required ongoing activity, or it did not. By rejecting 
Samsung’s argument that the claim required ongoing activity, the trial 
court effectively removed the issue as a potential non-infringement 
argument for Samsung. In Eon Corp., by contrast, the trial court’s 
rejection of Silver Spring’s proposal that the claims required a 
subscriber unit “designed to operate without a fixed location” did not 
resolve the underlying infringement question. The parties continued 
to dispute whether the accused utility meters were “portable” or 
 114. Id. at 1323 (Bryson, J. dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 1324. 
 116. Id. at 1329. 
117. Id.
 118. Id.
 119. Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1317; Summit 6, supra note 82. 
 120. Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1318; Summit 6, supra note 82, at 1291. 
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“mobile” under the “ordinary meaning” of those words.121 In other 
words, the potential scope of “portable” was not binary, but rather, 
fell on a continuum. Even if the trial court lopped off the furthest end 
of the continuum that would have guaranteed a win for Silver Spring, 
there was still ample room left for dispute at trial. 
Put another way, one interpretation of Eon Corp is that the duty 
under O2 Micro is to fully resolve disputes over how the words of the 
claim map to the specific things at issue. There may be underlying 
fact disputes about what those things are or how they work. But, once 
the jury resolves those underlying fact disputes, the court’s 
constructions should ideally compel a single outcome as to the 
presence or absence of a limitation in the accused product. When 
there is no underlying fact dispute, claim construction should be 
dispositive in and of itself. Eon Corp. demonstrates that rejecting a 
narrow construction in favor of “plain meaning” may meet these 
criteria, but there is no guarantee that it will do so. 
If this interpretation of Eon Corp. is correct, it significantly 
limits those cases where it is appropriate for a trial court to resolve a 
dispute by resorting to “plain meaning.” A claim construction order 
like the one in the Square case, for example, where the trial court 
assigns a “plain meaning” to most of the disputed terms with little 
analysis, would present a significant danger of ultimate reversal under 
this reading of Eon Corp.122
Of course, an early but limited claim construction order like the 
one in the Square case will not necessarily be the trial court’s last 
word on claim scope. The district court in the Square case could have 
revisited some of the “plain meaning” constructions at a later time, 
when the non-infringement disputes had further crystallized. The next 
section examines this procedural dimension of O2 Micro: at what 
point can the Court say that it has done enough? 
IV. WHEN IS IT TOO LATE TO ASK FOR FURTHER CONSTRUCTION?
There is no fixed rule that requires courts to construe claims at a 
particular point in the proceedings. District courts have experimented 
with different procedures. For example, it is not uncommon for 
district courts to forego a separate Markman hearing and construe 
 121. Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1318. 
 122. Unwired Planet, supra note 10, at *2 (citing O2 Micro, supra note 4). 
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claims in the course of summary judgment proceedings.123 Districts 
with heavy patent dockets, however, tend to have local rules or a 
general practice of scheduling separate Markman hearings within a 
set number of days of the Initial Case Management Conference.124
O2 Micro requires district courts to resolve disputes over claim 
scope.125 At the same time, Federal Circuit authority recognizes that 
there must be some limits on the demands that litigants can make of 
judicial resources. One limiting factor is that “only those terms need 
be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary 
to resolve the controversy.”126 Attorneys, however, are quite adept at 
generating controversies. This section discusses some of the 
procedural limits that the Federal Circuit has recognized on the duty 
to resolve disputes over claim scope. 
A. Waiting Too Long to Raise a Dispute Can Result in Waiver 
Soon after its opinion in O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit made 
clear that the duty to resolve disputes over claim scope does not mean 
that litigants can raise claim construction issues for the first time in 
post-trial motions.127 The Federal Circuit held that “litigants waive 
their right to present new claim construction disputes if they are 
raised for the first time after trial.”128
More recently, the Federal Circuit held that waiting to seek 
clarification of existing constructions until after the close of evidence 
may be too late.129 In Akamai v. Limelight, the Federal Circuit held 
that there was no violation of O2 Micro where the parties stipulated to 
claim construction, and the accused infringer only sought a narrower 
 123. See, e.g., Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc., 440 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Senior 
Judge Louis H. Pollak did not issue a separate Markman order; rather, in a carefully-crafted 
summary judgment opinion, he construed two limitations of claim 1 of the patent and found as a 
matter of law that neither limitation was present in the accused shoes.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Patent Local Rules, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA (Sept. 28, 2016), available at www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent. 
 125. O2 Micro, supra note 4. 
 126. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See
also, e.g., Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc., 607 F.3d 784, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The 
testimony of both sides’ experts at trial indicates that that term was not fundamentally in 
dispute, thus, it was proper for the district court not to construe it.”). 
 127. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 694 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 128. Id. (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Env’t Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006)). See also Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1359, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding waiver). 
 129. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2015).
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construction at the jury instruction stage.130 The Federal Circuit has 
also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding 
that a party could not add new claim construction theories on the eve 
of trial, where the request came a year after a formal claim 
construction process and Markman order that was “premised on the 
express belief that there were no other claim construction disputes.”131
The fact that the court need not entertain late claim construction 
requests from the parties, however, does not mean that it may not do 
so. The Federal Circuit has made clear that “district courts may 
engage in a rolling claim construction, in which the court revisits and 
alters its interpretation of the claim terms as its understanding of the 
technology evolves.”132 In one case, the Federal Circuit held that there 
was no error in the district court adjusting a Magistrate’s prior 
construction of a term in response to a cross-examination at trial that 
revealed a dispute over the scope of a claim term.133 Far from finding 
any error, the Federal Circuit held that the late clarification was 
consistent with the trial court’s duty under O2 Micro to resolve such 
disputes.134
B. Nuance Communications Confirms That Failure To 
Crystallize A Dispute Early Can Lead To Harsh Outcomes For 
The Proponent Of A Narrow Construction 
The decision of the Federal Circuit in Nuance Communications, 
Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc. arguably went further than 
prior precedent in limiting the procedural opportunities for a party to 
ask the court to resolve a dispute over claim scope.135
In that case, plaintiff Nuance asserted several patents against 
ABBYY related to optical character recognition or “OCR” 
technology.136 In an early Markman proceeding, the parties disputed 
the construction of “identifying said unknown character.”137 The 
accused infringer ABBYY proposed a narrower meaning for 
“identifying” that limited it to certain specific OCR techniques, while 
 130. Id.
 131. Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 640-41 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 132. Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 133. Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308, 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 134. Id. at 1315-16 (citing  O2 Micro, supra note 4). 
 135. Nuance Commc’ns, supra note 16. 
 136. Id. at 1369. 
137. Id.
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patent holder Nuance argued that “identifying” is “a simple word that 
is used every day and there is no indication that the inventors intended 
to use this term differently from its commonly understood 
meaning.”138 The district court agreed with Nuance and construed 
“identifying” to mean “identifying.”139
The parties then took discovery and filed summary judgment 
motions. It became apparent in the summary judgment briefing that 
the parties disagreed over the “plain meaning” of “identifying.”140
ABBYY’s expert argued that the accused software did not “identify” 
an unknown character because it merely produced “a list of guesses 
with associated confidence values.”141 In response, Nuance asked for 
briefing on the meaning of “identify” so that the dispute could be 
resolved before trial.142 The trial court refused.143 Noting that it had 
already held two claim construction hearings, the trial court held that 
the parties must either agree on a construction, or the court will 
supply a dictionary definition, or “just tell the jury to use its ordinary 
meaning.”144
Unsurprisingly, the parties failed to reach an agreement. The trial 
court then adopted a rather tautological dictionary definition of 
“identify” that had been proposed by ABBYY—”to establish the 
identity of.”145 The jury found that ABBYY did not infringe the 
patents.146
On appeal, Nuance argued that the district court had failed to 
exercise its duty to interpret the scope of the claim, as required by O2
Micro. The Federal Circuit disagreed.147 The Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning was primarily procedural: “The fact that shortly before trial 
Nuance became dissatisfied with its own proposed construction and 
sought a new one does not give rise to an O2 Micro violation.”148 The 
Federal Circuit cited Akamai v. Limelight, discussed above, in which 







 145. Id. at 1373. 
 146. Id. at 1370. 
 147. Id. at 1373. 
 148. Id. (citing Akamai, supra note 129). 
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the accused infringer sought to narrow a stipulated construction at the 
jury instruction stage.149
There is certainly an appeal to the argument that Nuance, having 
previously argued for “plain meaning,” made its bed and must lie in 
it. But one could also argue that this is a harsh outcome. Claim 
construction hearings are generally held prior to expert reports or 
summary judgment motions, and as appears to have been the case in 
Nuance, are often held prior even to the close of fact discovery.150 It 
can be very difficult, at an early stage, to anticipate every argument 
that the opposing party may raise to attempt to show that a particular 
feature is either within or outside of the scope of a claim term. 
In a similar vein, it is not clear that the analogy to the Akamai
case is a fair one. In Akamai, the accused infringer stipulated to one 
claim construction, then sought a narrower claim construction at the 
jury instruction phase, after the bulk of the trial was complete.151 The 
previously stipulated construction was not “plain meaning” but an 
actual definition that, the Federal Circuit held, excluded the narrower 
construction sought by the accused infringer at the jury instruction 
phase.152 In other words, what the Federal Circuit prohibited in that 
case was a change in position after trial. Here, what the plaintiff was 
arguably seeking was clarification, prior to trial, of an issue that the 
court had yet to address. 
To say that the Federal Circuit’s holding was harsh is not 
necessarily to say that it was wrong. District courts plainly need to be 
able to control their proceedings such that parties do not continue 
seeking to revise claim constructions ad infinitum. Parties should be 
motivated to crystallize disputes sooner rather than later, and may be 
less motivated to do so if they know that they can always revisit claim 
construction at a later date. The district court’s seeming impatience in 
the Nuance litigation is quite understandable in light of the fact that it 
had already held two claim construction hearings. Nonetheless, giving 
district courts the green light to leave claim scope to the jury unless 
the dispute is crystallized early in the litigation would be a significant 
limit on O2 Micro.
 149. Id. at 1373.
 150. Id. at 1372 (“The parties then took discovery and prepared for trial using the court’s 
construction.”).
 151. Akamai, supra note 129. 
 152. Id. (“The lack of further limitations was itself a characteristic of the construction to 
which both parties agreed.”). 
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The Nuance decision is somewhat ambiguous as to whether it 
was decided entirely on the procedural ground that Nuance’s request 
for clarification came too late. As an alternative to the argument that 
the trial court failed to resolve the claim construction dispute, Nuance 
argued that the trial court had in fact resolved the claim construction 
dispute against it. Nuance argued that the dictionary definition of 
“identify” that the trial court adopted conflicted with the intrinsic 
evidence, because portions of the specification indicated that 
“identifying” includes ambiguous identifications.153 The Federal 
Circuit responded that the trial court’s construction was in fact 
favorable to Nuance because “[o]ne could ‘establish the identity of’ a 
single character or a class of characters.”154 The Federal Circuit 
continued:
The operative words in the claims, then, are not “identifying” or 
“recognizing,” but instead are the object of those words—what is 
being identified or recognized. And that is exactly what the parties 
argued over at trial—Nuance contended that ABBYY’s software 
satisfies the “identifying an unknown character” limitation when 
its recognition process picks out a class of characters, while 
ABBYY presented evidence to the contrary. The district court did 
nothing to limit Nuance’s ability to present its evidence on this 
issue, and its instruction to the jury did not prevent the jury from 
fully considering each party’s position. After weighing the 
evidence, the jury agreed with ABBYY.155
There are two ways to read this holding. One interpretation is 
that there was no dispute over claim scope in the first place, but rather 
a fact dispute, which the jury resolved by “weighing the evidence.”156
This reading is problematic, however. There did not appear to be any 
dispute about how the accused FineReader software actually worked. 
As the Federal Circuit recited in its background facts, the software 
“produce[s] a list of ‘guesses’ and provide[s] a confidence value for 
each guess indicating how likely it is that the guess is correct.”157
Rather, the dispute was whether or not the phrase “identifying an 
unknown character” should be understood broadly enough to cover 
 153. Nuance Commc’ns, supra note 16, at 1373. 
 154. Id.
 155. Id. at 1373-74. 
 156. Id. at 1374. 
 157. Id. at 1371. 
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this functionality.158 The dispute was about mapping words to 
things—arguably the function of the court. 
A better interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s holding may be 
that Nuance not only asked too late, it asked the wrong question. It 
asked the court to construe the scope of “identifying,” when in fact, it 
should have asked the court to construe the scope of “what is being 
identified or recognized.”159 This, too, is a seemingly harsh outcome. 
While it is certainly incumbent on the parties in the first instance to 
correctly frame the question, the fundamental dispute was not 
mysterious: Is identifying a probabilistic set of characters “identifying 
an unknown character,” or is it not? That question, it appears, was left 
to the jury to decide. 
In short, the opinion in Nuance is a nuanced one, but at least one 
reading is that even a dispute over claim scope that was raised at the 
summary judgment stage may be allowed to go through to the jury, if 
the court determines that it should have been raised in an earlier 
Markman proceeding. 
C. GPNE Corp. Holds That It May Not Be Too Late, Even 
During Trial, To Seek Clarification 
Even more recently, the Federal Circuit held that two weeks into 
trial may not be too late to ask for a clarifying construction.160 The 
dispute in GNPE centered on the claim term “node,” which the trial 
court construed as a “pager with two-way data communications 
capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging 
system that operates independently from a telephone network.”161 The 
patent owner GPNE argued that including “pager” in the construction 
was too limiting, and that even if it “pager” was correct, that the trial 
court erred by failing to further construe the word “pager,” which left 
an issue of claim scope to the jury, contrary to O2 Micro.162
Apple, the accused infringer, argued that the inclusion of “pager” 
in the construction was correct, and that GPNE had waived its 
arguments under O2 Micro because it had failed to request a 
construction for “pager” during claim construction proceedings.163
The Federal Circuit held that while the inclusion of “pager” in the 
 158. Id. at 1373-74. 
 159. Id. at 1373. 
 160. GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d. 1365, 1372  (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
161. Id. at 1369. 
162. Id. at 1370. 
163. Id. at 1372. 
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construction was correct, it was not too late for GPNE to seek a 
clarification of “pager” by requesting a further jury instruction two 
weeks into trial.164 The Federal Circuit distinguished its previous 
holdings that claim construction disputes may not be raised to the trial 
court after trial, noting that the case had not yet gone to the jury.165
Further, the Federal Circuit noted that even during the Markman 
hearing, GPNE had argued that it was inappropriate to include 
“pager” in the claim construction because the parties would end up 
arguing over the definition of a pager.166
Though it found no waiver, the Federal Circuit nonetheless held 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to further construe “pager” 
during the trial.167 The Federal Circuit held that GPNE’s real 
complaint was that the trial court allowed Apple to argue to the jury 
that it does not infringe because the accused iPhones and iPads are 
unlike “1990’s-era legacy pagers.”168 But, according to the Federal 
Circuit, the existing construction, which required use of a “paging 
system that operates independently from a telephone network,” 
adequately clarified that the claimed pagers were unlike those legacy 
pagers.169 Construing the dispute as one about improper arguments to 
the jury, rather than one about inadequate claim construction, the 
Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that Apple’s arguments did not require a new trial.170 The 
Federal Circuit noted, for example, that GPNE had ample opportunity 
to rebut Apple’s argument in its examination of experts and its own 
closing argument, and that it availed itself of those opportunities.171
The most significant holding of GPNE for purposes of this 
Article is that it is not necessarily too late, even during trial, to invoke 
O2 Micro to seek further construction of a term that has already been 
construed. It remains to be seen whether future courts will limit this 
holding to situations where the party seeking the further construction 
first raised the potential ambiguity during Markman proceedings, or 
whether courts will take a more generous view and allow any bona 
164. Id.
165. Id. (distinguishing Lazare Kaplan Int'l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 
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fide request to clarify disputes over claim scope up through the 
submission of the case to the jury. 
The GPNE case also serves as a reminder of the more hands-on 
role that trial courts could play in disposing of infringement disputes 
through early resolution of disputes over claim scope. In the very last 
paragraph of the opinion, the Federal Circuit observes that “GPNE 
does not appear to articulate an infringement position under the 
district court’s construction of ‘node.’”172 In a footnote, the Federal 
Circuit further explains that “GPNE has not developed any argument 
for why the following evidence fails to support the jury’s non-
infringement verdict. All of the accused devices operate on either 
GPRS or LTE networks. At trial, GPNE’s expert conceded that both 
of these networks become inoperable without GSM resources, J.A. 
28417, and that the GSM system is a ‘telephone network.’ J.A. 28413. 
Apple’s expert testified to the same. See J.A. 28901–03, 28906. 
Linking these statements together yields the conclusion that the 
accused devices do not ‘operate independently of a telephone 
network.’”173
In other words, the Federal Circuit found on appeal that based on 
the undisputed evidence that the accused iPhones and iPads use a 
“telephone network,” the trial court’s construction of “node” 
precluded this possibility of infringement. This begs the question of 
why the case had to go to a jury trial in the first place. While there 
may have been factual disputes about “telephone networks” leading 
up to trial that are not apparent from the face of the GPNE opinion,
this final footnote is at least suggestive that the trial court, in 
resolving the scope of the claim term “node,” might have been able to 
resolve the case in its entirety. This, in turn, is a powerful reminder 
that the mandate in O2 Micro that judges must resolve disputes over 
claim scope can, in effect, be a mandate to judges to resolve patent 
disputes before they reach a jury. 
CONCLUSION
After several years of experience with O2 Micro, the contours of 
the courts’ “duty to construe” are becoming more clear. As the above 
discussion demonstrates, however, district courts still have significant 
leeway in how to approach their duty to resolve disputes over claim 
scope. 
172. Id. at 1374. 
173. Id. at 1374 n.1. 
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District courts are experimenting with ways to push parties to 
articulate claim construction disputes in ways that will be dispositive. 
The Northern District of California requires litigants to identify the 
claim terms for construction that may be claim or case dispositive.174
Judge Robinson in the District of Delaware requires that for “any 
contested claim limitation, each party must submit a proposed 
construction,” noting that “[r]esorting to ‘plain and ordinary’ meaning 
is not sufficient, as it effectively leaves claim construction in the 
hands of the experts rather than the court.”175 Chief Judge Stark in the 
same district had adopted Judge Robinson’s reasoning, if not her 
outright prohibition on “plain meaning” constructions.176
These trial courts appropriately read O2 Micro as a mandate to 
take an active role through claim construction in ensuring that trial 
outcomes are grounded in protecting what the inventor actually 
invented. Cleanly mapping words to things is not easy, but it is the 
system we have, and it is the diligent efforts of judges that ultimately 
make that system work. 
 174. Patent Local Rules, supra note 124, at 4-3(c). 
 175. The Honorable Sue L. Robinson, Patent Case Scheduling Order (Feb. 5, 2015), at 4 
& n.6, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/SLR/Forms/Sched-Order-
Patent2-05-15.pdf.
 176. The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Revised Procedures for Managing Patent Cases
(June 18, 2014) at 8, 
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/LPS/PatentProcs/LPS-
PatentProcedures.pdf.
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